Post-War Mid-East Slides

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Juan Cole’s Jihad Against Israel

by Cinnamon Stillwell
FrontPageMagazine.com
July 9, 2008
http://www.meforum.org/article/1930

One can always count on University of Michigan history professor Juan Cole to excuse violence and hatred directed at Israel. At his blog, Informed Comment (which, judging by the references to the mythical Jenin “massacre” and the USS Liberty canard in the comments section, is read avidly by anti-Israel conspiracy theorists), Cole takes pains to explain away last week’s horrific bulldozer attack in Jerusalem.

Cole apparently sees no contradiction between his perfunctory admission that “Violence against innocent civilians is always condemnable and deplored by IC,” and his claim to add “context” to the attack by trying to justify the alleged motivations of the perpetrator, Palestinian construction worker Husam Taysir Dwayat.

Citing Al-Jazeera International (one of his favored sources), Cole asserts that, “the bulldozer operator had been working on a controversial rail line connecting West Jerusalem to Arab East Jerusalem, which many Palestinians feel will further disadvantage them.” He then launches into a litany of Israel’s supposed sins, including demolishing illegal buildings in East Jerusalem, what he calls “rapid encroachments on the Palestinians in the West Bank,” the so-called “violence of Israeli colonists (many of them Americans) against native Palestinians,” and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) use of military action to protect Israeli citizens from their genocidal neighbors.

Among his sources, Cole cites the Israeli leftist “human rights group” B’Tselem, which has been known to play fast and loose with facts in order to provide a sympathetic media with lurid stories about imagined Israeli human rights transgressions—qualities that make the group an ideal source for Cole’s unlimited paranoia. Earlier this year Cole used the occasion of the Hamas-inspired media fabrication regarding electricity and fuel shortages to accuse Israel of perpetrating atrocities, war crimes, and slavery against Gazans, not to mention killing asthmatics and newborns. Yet Cole can’t muster the same outrage over the calculated murder of women, children, infants, and any civilian unlucky enough to have crossed paths with Dwayat’s bulldozer.

As for Dwayat’s motivations, Cole chooses to ignore the fact that he yelled “Allah Akbar” while stepping on the gas pedal, that his mother praised him as a shaheed (martyr) while ululating from the balcony of the family home, or that Palestinian terrorist groups are tripping over themselves trying to take credit for the attack. Meanwhile, his family blames the Jewish woman with whom Dwayat was once involved (and who he was convicted of raping) and his neighbors continue to repeat rumors about “haredi teenagers” throwing stones at Dwayat the day before the attack. But in Cole’s morally relativistic world, Dwayat was simply forced to mow down Israeli civilians because he was “seized with a fit of rage over accumulated grievances in his own mind, real or imagined.” So much for context.

Such obfuscation is standard fare for Cole, who continues to insist that Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinjad was mistranslated when, at the aptly named World without Zionism conference in October, 2005, he said that Israel should be “wiped off the map.” Of course, the Iranian regime constantly calls for Israel’s destruction and regularly evinces hatred towards Jews. Iran’s state-run television replays a seemingly endless repertoire of conspiratorial, anti-Semitic programming, much of which mirrors Nazi-era propaganda. The allegation that the films “Chicken Run” and “Saving Private Ryan” are tools for “Zionist propaganda” is just a recent example. Perhaps Cole can justify that ludicrous claim as well. After all, he’s accused Jewish-American officials of dual loyalty, and he has a habit of taking Iranian regime-owned press at face value.

Cole’s use of his blog to peddle conspiratorial tendencies directed at the United States in general, and those on the right in particular, is nothing new. Writing at his blog in January this year, Cole implied that the harassment of U.S. Navy vessels in the Straits of Hormuz by Iranian patrol craft was part of a GOP conspiracy. As Campus Watch director Winfield Myers noted at the time:

That a Middle East studies professor upon whom the press relies for insight into this key region can be so wrong-headed in so many ways—and in a single blog post—bodes ill for efforts to bring supply the American public with accurate, reliable information about the Middle East. Overt biases, a selective reading of sources to support preordained conclusions, an eagerness to believe the press of foreign dictatorships over one’s own Navy, and the reliance on crude conspiracy theories will ensure only that consumers of media reports on the region are too often misinformed, and that academic Middle East specialists are further discredited.

The real context for Cole’s apologia for Dwayat, the bulldozer terrorist, and his “grievances,” is that Cole’s so-called informed commentary is a font of uninformed conspiracy-mongering where terrorists are excused and the regimes that support them whitewashed.

Cinnamon Stillwell is the Northern California Representative for Campus Watch, a project of the Middle East Forum. She can be reached at stillwell@meforum.org.

What’s at Stake for the West in Lebanon?

A briefing by David Wurmser
March 6, 2008
http://www.meforum.org/article/1878

David Wurmser is a specialist on the Middle East and served as an advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney until recently. His prior positions included special assistant to John R. Bolton at the Department of State and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Wurmser is the author of numerous influential papers and three books, including Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein (AEI Press, 1999). In 2000, he contributed to the Middle East Forum’s Lebanon Study Group report, “Ending Syria’s Occupation of Lebanon: The U.S. Role,” which condemned Syria’s occupation of Lebanon. He received a Ph.D. in international relations from Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Wurmser addressed the Middle East Forum on March 6, 2008 in New York City.

“Iran’s Stake in the Levant”

Mr. Wurmser calls Lebanon a “key battleground between the West as a whole and the forces that seek to drag the Middle East down.” The situation in Lebanon must be viewed in the context of the larger conflict in the region, which is becoming far more dangerous. Two years after the Cedar Revolution in March 2005, which was brought on by the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, the Lebanese are still living through a tragedy. The inability to install a new president today is indicative of the situation. It is because of the size and success of the popular demonstrations by the Lebanese, however, that Lebanon has become the focal point of the enemies of the West, namely Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah.

Mr. Wurmser focused on the Iranian strategy toward Lebanon, arguing that Iran is undergoing a transformation, not in the direction of reform as the West hopes, but from a pure theocracy toward a “theofascist state on the edge of an even more aggressive foreign policy.” This transformation in Iranian politics, according to Mr. Wurmser, is being played out in Lebanon and in Gaza.

Top American officials have made statements to the effect that U.S. and U.N. sanctions have hurt the Iranian regime, and that the support for former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and other figures deemed “moderate” in the December 2006 elections indicated the weakening of the Iranian regime. Mr. Wurmser asserts that this perception is false because it ignores the real indicators. Rather, a new power structure is emerging in Iran that is closely aligned with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. For example, Ahmadinejad fired many government officials and replaced them with a group of hard-core members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Mr. Wurmser singled out Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejehei, whom Ahmadinejad placed in control of Intelligence, who espouses an aggressive anti-Western foreign policy and supports terrorism; and Saeed Jalili, whom Ahmadinejad appointed as head nuclear negotiator for Iran, is a veteran of the IRGC who was mutilated in the Iran-Iraq war.

Mr. Wurmser traced several of Ahmadinejad’s actions to Jalili’s 1990 book, Foreign Policy of the Prophet, arguing that Jalili’s writings, though they describe the time of Muhammad, are a blueprint for Iran today. Jalili cites an episode in which Muhammad told his followers to proselytize, not negotiate. In this spirit, Ahmedinejad has fired ambassadors and replaced them with more proselytizing ones. Jalili wrote about how Muhammad and his successors sent letters out to other tribes telling them to “convert or you will face the sword,” as well as to major powers in Byzantium and Persia. Mr. Wurmser linked this to Ahmedinejad’s sending similar letters to President Bush. He pointed out how the “language is lifted straight out of Jalili’s book, and that, in fact, “Jalili is the mind behind Ahmedinejad.”

Mr. Wurmser analyzed tensions between IRGC officers and the ayatollahs whom the officers believe “betrayed the will of Allah” when they signed the treaty ending the Iran-Iraq war. A separate group of ayatollahs, based in Mashhad in northeastern Iran, sees itself as true believers. This group considers the current state of Islam to be weak, and it seeks to expose the West as “a collapsing, hollow tree.” It expects the imminent return of the Twelfth Imam, the hidden Imam at the center of the Twelver Sh’ia movement of Islam. Its version of Islam is messianic and apocalyptic, and according to Mr. Wurmser, it provides the ideological basis for Iran’s shift to a more aggressive and risk-seeking stance against the West.

He also identified a radical change in Iranian’s notion of Islam. While the Iranian revolution defended Shi’ite interests and opposed Arab nationalism, over the past four years, “Iran has made a bold move to co-opt Arab nationalism.” The Arab-Israeli conflict has become a key issue on which Iran can attempt to seize leadership of the Islamic world from the Sunnis and Arabs. A central part of Iran’s national policy, Mr. Wurmser asserted, is to have an active war with Israel, be victorious, and seize leadership of the Muslim world. Iran’s success at assuming the mantle of Islam is evident in that in the past two or three years, Muslim Brotherhood leaders have recognized that Shi’ites are true Muslims, a concept that they had vehemently opposed previously.

Mr. Wurmser argued that Iran needs Syria in order to co-opt Sunni politics and Arab nationalism. He called Syria a “geographic gateway for Iran to be a player in the Arab-Israeli conflict,” and through this, to maintain the appearance of a successful Iranian revolution. Ahmedinejad came to power because it was thought that the Iranian revolution was weak. If Syria collapses, Mr. Wurmser thinks Iran will implode and that Syria is the avenue through which to attack Iran. Gaza is also a battleground for Iran, said Wurmser, citing that 80% of terrorist activity in Gaza is committed by a force trained in Iran that answers directly to Damascus and Tehran.

Mr. Wurmser considers things to have gone well for Ahmadinejad in the last few months. He compared Ahmadinejad’s bold opposition to the West and accusations of cowardliness on the part of followers who urge a more cautious policy to the way Hitler galvanized his generals in the 1930s by accusing them of lack of will. Disturbingly, each crisis increases Ahmadinejad’s reputation as his supporters rally round him.

In his recommendation for American foreign policy, Mr. Wurmser stressed that the United States must take into account how its policies are perceived in the Middle East. In 2003, when the United States acquiesced to the European acceptance of the Iranian regime as a legitimate interlocutor on nuclear issues, the Iranians read this as tacit acceptance and, therefore, weakness. During the same year, when the U.N. sanctioned the American presence in Iraq, Iran saw this as weakness on the American part because the superpower asked for permission to strike. Mr. Wurmser described the summer of 2003 as a “key moment, because the momentum the Iranian people were building against the regime was punctured by perceived American weakness.”

On the question of what concrete things the United States can do to support democracy in Lebanon, Mr. Wurmser emphasized the need for swift response to the assassinations of Lebanese leaders. At least six government officials have been killed since Hariri, but the U.S. response has been slow and ineffective. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and Syria are “killing the Lebanese government out of existence.” Mr. Wurmser concluded that “the United States can have an effect if we show we are committed to acting to preserve what happened in March 2005″ when the Lebanese staged the Cedar Revolution.

Summary account by Mimi Stillman

Hizbullah: A Short History

Hezbollah: A Short History

by Augustus Richard Norton
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 187 pp. $16.95.

Reviewed by Hilal Khashan
American University of Beirut

Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2008
http://www.meforum.org/article/1903

Norton, a professor at Boston University, disdains the “simplistic stereotypes” about Hezbollah and promises in his book a “balanced, nuanced account of this complex organization.” But his superficial treatment fails miserably. Norton summarily dismisses Hezbollah’s terrorist credentials, which he conveniently attributes to Iran. He describes Hezbollah as a Lebanese organization and neglects to link its ideology to Khomeini’s wilayat al-Faqih or guardianship of the jurisconsult concept. He ignores the organic linkage between Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Republic.

Written in the wake of the 34-day summer war of 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah, Hezbollah: A Short History is intended to have mass market appeal. It fails for many reasons: Because it offers nothing new, is more entertaining than informative, and contains an inappropriately casual style, plus numerous typos, and countless factual errors, it is unappealing to the reader. The book is not nearly short enough but offers an overly-long lesson in faulty information, bad English, and worse Arabic.

Norton butchers Arabic words and phrases. In Norton’s dictionary of wrong definitions, sitt, Arabic for lady, becomes “sister.” His translation of “the July war” is Harb al-Tammuz—”the war of the July.” Then there is “the hawk of Lebanon,” which in Arabic becomes al-Saqr Lubnan—”the hawk Lebanon.” Kamal Jumblatt is al-Jumblatt, yes, “the Jumblatt.” The Norton is out of control. This book is a linguistic bloodbath.

Factually this book hardly does better. Norton cites June 5, 1982, as the date of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, but it took place on June 6. He refers to former prime minister Salim al-Huss’s “daughters” when Huss has only one daughter. He states that both Shi‘i and the majority of Sunni Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad is the “Rasul” (prophet), whereas, of course, all Muslims by definition believe that the Prophet is the Rasul. On page 11, he announces that there are seventeen recognized sects in Lebanon, but on page 46, there are now eighteen such sects. Here Hassan Nasrallah is “sayyid,” and there he is “seyyid.” Norton’s spelling is abysmal, including such howlers as the “Lebanonese government” and “Sierre Leone.”

Norton fails to properly account for Hezbollah’s propaganda against Israel. On page 91, he says Hezbollah exhibited a slogan in Hebrew near the Israeli border that read: “If you come back, we’ll come back.” This is not a slogan, but verse 17: 8 from the Qur’an.

Oddly, this self-proclaimed history of Hezbollah is two-thirds not about Hezbollah, discussing instead Shi‘ism in general and the confessional nature of Lebanese politics. Is the book’s title a marketing ploy or evidence of Norton’s ignorance of the subject?

Norton’s book is the literary equivalent of antifreeze laced Chinese toothpaste. Has the Princeton press abandoned its review process?

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UnHoly War: Terror in the Name of Islam – A Review

Unholy War:
Terror in the Name of Islam

Review by Muqtedar Khan, Ph.D.

John L. Esposito, Unholy Wars: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 196. Hardback, US $25.00.

John Esposito is easily one of the world’s most preeminent scholars of Islam. His voice carries authority not only in the West but also in the Muslim World. In keeping with his stature as an important commentator on Islam, Esposito has responded to the attacks of September 11^th, 2001, by writing a very important book. – Unholy Wars: Terror in the Name of Islam.

In Unholy Wars, Esposito systematically addresses the political antecedents to the 9/11 attacks on the US by Al-Qaeda, the international terrorist organization masterminded by Usama Binladen. Esposito examines the recent history of US relations with the Muslim world and explains how a global sentiment of anti-Americanism has emerged in the Muslim World. He shows with great clarity how economic conditions, political underdevelopment, the shadow of Israeli occupation of Palestine and the continued presence of US supported authoritarian regimes in the Arab world have led to the festering of a deep seated resentment and anger towards the US. In a very systematic way Esposito succeeds in unraveling the layered complexity of global politics and explains how the phenomenon of global terrorism articulated in the language of Islam has emerged as a counter hegemonic force to pax Americana.

The book begins with the story of Binladen and his rise from a shy youth to the preeminent ideologue of Jihad International. In Esposito’s narrative this mythical demon is humanized and it becomes easier for even the uninitiated to understand the choices that Binladen made and the historical and geopolitical circumstances that shaped his destiny.

In chapter two Esposito writes a revealing genealogy of Jihad. He shows how and why this very important Islamic concept has now become a central pillar of Muslim consciousness and self-understanding. He also argues that the very understanding jihad is complex as well as contested. Going as far back as the Kharijite movement in early Islam, Esposito traces the different meanings that various Muslim scholars and groups have given to the principle of Jihad. He makes it clear that Jihad has shaped Muslim politics and its meanings have also been shaped by Muslim politics. It becomes clear how different Muslims can have such differing understanding of Jihad. For example Esposito points to how the present grand mufti of Egypt considers suicide bombing as martyrdom while the present grand mufti of Saudi Arabia declares it unIslamic (p. 100). He follows the genealogy of Jihad with a comprehensive survey of global Islamic militancy covering the entire spread of Islam from Indonesia to the US. The survey establishes how the different understanding of Jihad has shaped the various tactics adopted by Islamic movements and Islamic militants.

Esposito also address the loud claims of neoconservatives in America who claim that Islam itself, not just radical Muslims, is inherently incompatible with the cluster of values which some pretentious westerners call Western and liberals call universal. Esposito disabuses the notion that Islam and capitalism, Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights are incompatible. He also examines in great depth the struggle for women’s rights in Muslim societies today.

Finally Esposito focuses on what must be done next. He raises the issue of “root causes” (p. 160) and makes no bones about stating that unless Muslim grievances are addressed wisely and the economic and political conditions that engender terrorism ameliorated, globalism terrorism will continue to plague the West and authoritarian Muslim regimes. He however stops short of making any specific policy recommendations with regards to how the US may specifically deal with Iraq or Hamas or Saudi Arabia’s linkage with Wahhabism. The role of this book is to provide an understanding of the context – political and historical – that motivates Muslims terrorism and how these so called Islamic warriors implicate Islam in their dastardly tactics.

Nevertheless Esposito does not pull any punches in making it clear that Islam is a global force and will remain so for a long time to come. He also seems to suggest that Islamism may well grow rather than ebb. He fears that the shortsighted vision that is guiding the so called war on terrorism that seems to rely on military options more than diplomacy and social change may well prove to be counterproductive. Instead of eliminating terror, he fears, it may engender greater anti-American and anti-Western sentiment and lead to more bloodshed and global instability.

http://www.ijtihad.org/esposito.htm

Muslim Nations in Contemporary History Course Syllabus

SYNOPSIS: This course traces the emergence of independent Muslim nation-states, and their impact on socio-political and ideological structure of Muslim society. It examines the relationship between the West and Muslim nation states during the Cold War. It highlights the role of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), its functions, structures, problems and prospects in the era of globalization.

Weeks	Topics	Readings
1. 7 & 9 July	Introduction and Conceptual Frameworks	Hand-outs
2 14, 16 July	Muslim responses to European colonialism and modernization The Tanzimat and modernization of the Ottoman sultanate. The nationalist movements	Esposito (1998), 33-98.
3-5. 21, 23 July 28, 30 July 4, 6 Aug	Emergence of Muslim nation states The emergence of modern Turkey. The emergence of modern Iran The emergence of the modern Saudi Kingdom. Iraq & Transjordan (Cleveland, 191-201) Syria & Lebanon (Cleveland, 202-215)	Esposito (1998), 99-136. Gold, 211-223 224-229 230-237
6 11, 13 Aug	Islamic resurgence in the Muslim World	Esposito (1998), 136-157.
7 18-20 Aug	Islamic revolution in Iran
8-9 25, 27 Aug 8, 10 Sep	The Palestinian issue The emergence of the state of Israel. The war of 1967. The Camp David Accords, 1978. Oslo Accord, 1993. Al-Aqsa intifadah and its political consequences.	Husain (1995), 178-200. Saleh, (2000), 30-83.
10 15 Sep 17 Sep nuzul Quran	Inter-governmental organizations The creation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Functions and structures. Problems and prospects.	Husain (1995), 201-216. Ahsan, (1986).
11 22, 24 Sep	US foreign policies in the Middle East Ideological conflict. Utilization of nature resources. The state of Israel.
12-13 6, 8 Oct 13, 15 Oct	Recent Developments: (1970s to1990s) Libya (Esposito,161-171) Pakistan (171-196) Taliban (233-235) Egypt (235-260) Sudan (260-273) Lebanon (273-289) Iraq (289-287) Algeria 302-308
14 20, 22 Oct	International Terrorism and the Muslim World	Esposito

Required Readings

John L. Esposito, (1998), Islam and Politics, 4^th ed., (Syracuse. New York: Syracuse University Press

Cleveland, W.L. (2000). A History of the Modern Middle East. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.

Goldschmidt, A. (2003). A concise history of the Middle East. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.