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  • zhafiz 9:10 am on November 4, 2008 Permalink | Reply  

    It’s the Policy, Stupid: Political Islam and US Foreign Policy 

    It’s the Policy, Stupid

    Political Islam and US Foreign Policy by John Esposito

    John L. Esposito is University Professor of Religion & International Affairs and Director of the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University. He is the author of Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam and co-author with Dalia Mogahed of Can You Hear Me Now? Listening to the Voices of 1 Billion Muslims (forthcoming).

    US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. Bush. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. However, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

    As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, terrorism, and peace in the Middle East.

    Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Thus, for example, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

    In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?

    A new Gallup World Study overwhelmingly suggests the latter. The poll, whose results are released for the first time in this article, now enables us to get beyond conflicting analyses of experts and selective voices from the “Arab street.” It lets us listen to one billion Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia. And they tell us that US policies, not values, are behind the ire of the Arab/Muslim world.

    Political Islam: Ballots or Bullets?

    History demonstrates that political Islam is both extremist and mainstream. On the one hand, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran, the Taliban’s Afghanistan, and Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda as well as terrorists from Morocco to Indonesia have espoused a revolutionary Islam that relies on violence and terror. On the other, many Islamist social and political movements across the Muslim world have worked within the political system.

    Since the late 20th century Islamically-oriented candidates and political parties in Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia have opted for ballots, not bullets. They have successfully contested and won municipal and parliamentary seats, held cabinet positions, and served in senior positions such as prime minister of Turkey and Iraq and president of Indonesia.

    Elections since late 2001 in Pakistan, Turkey, Bahrain, and Morocco as well as in Palestine, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have reinforced the continued saliency of Islam in Muslim politics in the 21st century. The more contentious aspect of political Islam has been the extent to which militant groups like Hizbollah and HAMAS have turned to the ballot box. Hizbollah transformed itself into a Lebanese political party that has proven effective in parliamentary elections. At the same time, it remained a militia, fighting and eventually forcing Israeli withdrawal in 2000 from its 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon. HAMAS defeated the PLO in democratic elections.

    In responding to mainstream and extremist political Islam, US foreign policymakers require a better understanding of how global Muslim majorities see the world and, in particular, how they regard the United States. The new Gallup World Poll now enables us to move towards that understanding, finally answering the oft-asked questions: What do Muslims polled across the world have to say? How many Muslims hold extremist views? What are their priorities? What do they admire and what do they resent about the United States and the West?

    According to the Gallup Poll, 7 percent think the 9/11 attacks were “completely” justified and are very critical of the United States. Among those who believe that 9/11 was not justified, whom we’ll call the moderates, 40 percent are pro-US and 60 percent view the United States unfavorably.

    It is important to look more closely at the 7 percent of whom we can call “anti-US extremists,” not because all or even a significant number of them commit acts of violence, but because those with extremist views are a potential source for recruitment or support for terrorist groups. This group of potential extremists is also more likely to view other civilian attacks as justifiable. In contrast to 95 percent of moderates who said that “Other attacks in which civilians are the target were ‘mostly’ or ‘completely’ unjustified,” only 70 percent of the potential radicals agreed with this statement.

    Why Do They Hate Us?

    Is there a blind hatred of the United States? The question “Why do they hate us?” raised in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 looms large following continued terrorist attacks and the dramatic growth of anti-Americanism. A common answer provided by some politicians and experts has been, “They hate our way of life, our freedom, democracy, and success.” Considering the broad based anti-Americanism, not only among extremists but also among a significant mainstream majority in the Muslim world (and indeed in many other parts of the world), this answer is not satisfactory. Although the Muslim world expresses many common grievances, do extremists and moderates differ in attitudes about the West?

    Focusing on the attitudes of those with radical views and comparing them with the moderate majority results in surprising findings. When asked what they admired most about the West, both extremists and moderates had the identical top three spontaneous responses: (1) technology; (2) the West’s value system, hard work, self-responsibility, rule of law, and cooperation; and (3) its fair political systems, democracy, respect for human rights, freedom of speech, and gender equality. A significantly higher percent of potential extremists than moderates (50 percent versus 35 percent) believe that “moving towards greater governmental democracy” will foster progress in the Arab/Muslim world. Potential extremists believe even more strongly than moderates (58 percent versus 45 percent) that Arab/Muslim nations are eager to have better relations with the West. Finally, no significant difference exists between the percentage of potential extremists and moderates who said “better relations with the West concerns me a lot.”

    While many believe anti-Americanism is tied to a basic hatred of the West and deep West-East religious and cultural differences, the data above contradicts these views. In addition, Muslim assessments of individual Western countries demonstrate that Muslim views do not paint all Western countries with the same brush. Unfavorable opinions of the United States or the United Kingdom do not preclude favorable attitudes towards other Western countries like France or Germany. Data shows that while moderates have very unfavorable opinions of the United States (42 percent) and Great Britain (34 percent), unfavorable opinions of France (15 percent) and Germany (13 percent) were far less and in fact comparable to the percent of Muslims who viewed Pakistan or Turkey unfavorably (both at 12 percent).

    Democratic Exceptionalism?

    What creates unfavorable attitudes towards the United States? Belief that the United States is serious about democracy in Muslim countries has long been undermined by what is perceived as the United States’ “double standard” in promoting democracy. Key factors of this perception include a long track record of supporting authoritarian regimes in the Arab and Muslim world while not promoting democracy there as it did elsewhere after the fall of the Soviet Union. Then, when weapons of mass destruction were not to be found in Iraq, the Bush administration boldly declared that the US-led invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein were intended to bring democracy to Iraq as part of a broader policy of promoting democracy in the Middle East. In a major policy address, Ambassador Richard Haass, a senior State Department official in the George W. Bush administration, acknowledged that both Democratic and Republican administrations had practiced what he termed “Democratic Exceptionalism” in the Muslim world: subordinating democracy to other national interests such as accessing oil, containing the Soviet Union, and grappling with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

    While the spread of democracy has been the stated goal of the United States, majorities in every nation surveyed by Gallup do not believe that the United States was serious about the establishment of democratic systems in the region. For example, only 24 percent in Egypt and Jordan and only 16 percent in Turkey agreed that the United States was serious about establishing democratic systems. The largest groups in agreement are in Lebanon and Indonesia at 38 percent; but even there, 58 percent of Lebanese and 52 percent of Indonesians disagreed with the statement.

    How can this be? Responses to another question shed some light. When respondents were asked if they believe the United States will allow people in the region to fashion their own political future as they see fit without direct US influence, only 22 percent of Jordanians agreed, and as low as 16 percent of Pakistanis. Yet, while saying that the United States is not serious about self-determination and democracy in the Muslim world, many respondents say the thing they admire most about the West is political liberty and freedom of speech. Large percentages also associate a fair judicial system and

    “citizens enjoying many liberties” with Western societies while critiquing their own societies. Lack of political freedom was what they admired least about the Islamic/Arab world.

    The United States After Gaza and Lebanon

    Muslim perceptions of the US role and response to the Israeli wars in Gaza and Lebanon must also be seen within the broad context of the Arab and Muslim world. From North Africa to Southeast Asia, the Gallup World Poll indicates that majorities in every predominantly Muslim country surveyed associate “ruthless” with the United States (68 percent in Turkey, 85 percent in Morocco). Muslim publics are also much less likely to say the US is “trustworthy” when compared to other Western nations. For example, only 4 percent of Egyptians consider the US “trustworthy,” while 22 percent associate this description with France and Japan, and 18 percent with Germany. Outside of Iraq, majorities also agreed that the invasion of Iraq has done more harm than good (ranging from 52 percent in Iran to 91 percent in Egypt). The Bush administration recognized that the war on global terrorism has come to be equated in the minds of many Muslims (and others) with a war against Islam and the Muslim world and reemphasized the importance of public diplomacy. The administration appointed a senior Bush confidante, Karen Hughes, as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, and spoke of a war of ideas. However, public diplomacy is more than public relations. It is about acting consistently with the words one speaks – and so a return to foreign policy.

    The administration’s responses in Gaza and in Lebanon undercut both the president’s credibility and the war on terrorism. The United States turned a blind eye to Israel’s launching of two wars in which civilians were the primary casualties. The United States failed to support UN mediation in the face of clear violations of international law, refused to heed calls for a ceasefire and UN intervention, and continued to provide military assistance to Israel. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s criticism of the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon as an “excessive use of force” was countered the next day by the New York Times headline United States speeds up bomb delivery for the Israelis.

    America’s unconditional support of Israel cast it in the eyes of many as a partner, not simply in military action against HAMAS or Hizbollah militants, but in a war against the democratically elected Palestinian government in Gaza and the government of Lebanon, a long-time US ally. The primary victims in Gaza and Lebanon were hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, not terrorists. In Lebanon, more than 500 were killed, 2,000 wounded, and 800,000 displaced. Israeli’s military destroyed the civilian infrastructures of both Gaza and Lebanon. International organizations like the United Nations, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch have criticized Israel for violating international law. Amnesty and Human Rights Watch has specifically cited the use of collective punishment and war crimes. The regional blowback from the approach that the United States has taken will be enormous and enduring.

    The Bush administration’s promotion of democracy and the Middle East Peace Process are in critical condition. The United States remains mired in Iraq and Afghanistan with no clear “success” stories in sight. The situation has been compounded by the US failure to respect the democratic choice of Palestinians, whatever its reservations, and then its passive and active compliance with Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon. HAMAS and Hizbollah have become symbols of resistance, enjoying a level of support that would have been unimagined in the past throughout much of the Muslim world. At the same time, many US allies in the Arab/Muslim world increasingly use the threat of extreme Islamists and the war against terrorism as excuses for increased authoritarianism and repression, trading their support for United States backing down on its democratic agenda. The unintended consequences of uncritical US support for Israel’s extended war have played right into the hands of the Bin Ladens of the world.

    A critical challenge for US policymakers will continue to be the need to distinguish between mainstream and extremists groups and to work with democratically-elected Islamists. US administrations have often said that they distinguish between mainstream and extremist groups. However, more often that not, they have looked the other way when autocratic rulers in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere have intimidated and suppressed mainstream Islamist groups or attempted to reverse their successes in elections in the past several decades.

    In the early 1990s, the Algerian military intervened to deny the Islamic Salvation Front its victory in parliamentary elections. Both the Algerian and Tunisian governments arrested and tried the Islamic party militarily, and were denounced by the international community. More recently, Egyptian elections were marred by attempts to silence opposition candidates, including the Muslim Brotherhood. In the post-election period, the Mubarak government, a long-time US ally, imprisoned the only opposition presidential candidate and cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian press. Despite its commitment to democratization, the Bush administration has been virtually silent.

    A more recent and complex challenge is dealing with resistance movements like HAMAS and Hizbollah. Both are elected political parties with a popular base. At the same time they are resistance movements whose militias have fought Israeli occupation and whom Israel, the United States, and Europe have labeled as terrorist organizations. There are established precedents for dealing with such groups, such as the ANC in South Africa and Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA in Ireland, groups with which we’ve had to come to terms. The United States and others need to deal with the democratically elected officials, while also strongly condemning any acts of terrorism by their militias. Diplomacy, economic incentives, and sanctions should be emphasized, with military action taken as a last resort. However, overuse of economic sanctions by the Clinton and Bush administrations has reduced US negotiating leverage with countries like Iran and Sudan.

    Equally difficult, the United States, while affirming its enduring support for Israel’s existence and security, must clearly demonstrate that this support has clear limits. The United States should condemn Israel’s disproportionate use of force, collective punishment, and other violations of international law. Finally, most fundamental and important is the recognition that widespread anti-Americanism among mainstream Muslims and Islamists results from what the United States does—its policies and actions—not its way of life, culture, or religion.

    The Gallup Organization, in association with Gallup Senior Scientist John L. Esposito, is producing the “largest, most in-depth study of Muslim opinion ever done.” Its careful and rigorous methodology has taken care to ensure that the data is nationally representative, with questions and interview lengths standardized across nations and over time. The preliminary findings of the Gallup study reflect the voices and opinions of 800 million Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia. Samples include at least 1,000 adults surveyed in each of the poll’s 10 targeted preliminary countries. By the end of 2006, the study will reflect the views of more than one billion Muslims in nearly 40 countries, about 90 percent of the world’s Muslim population.

     
  • zhafiz 12:00 pm on August 4, 2008 Permalink | Reply  

    150 Fatah supporters enter Israel after Hamas takes over east Gaza 

    http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/08/02/palestinian.infighting/index.html?eref=rss_world

    GAZA CITY (CNN) — About 150 pro-Fatah Palestinians seeking refuge from a Hamas crackdown in eastern Gaza City were allowed into Israel on Saturday, an Israel Defense Forces spokesman told CNN.

    Fatah members are led handcuffed and blindfolded through a Gaza City checkpoint into Israel on Saturday.

    Fatah members are led handcuffed and blindfolded through a Gaza City checkpoint into Israel on Saturday.

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    They were let in at the request of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas after Hamas took control of a neighborhood in eastern Gaza City on Saturday.

    The Palestinians entered through a security checkpoint in Nahal Oz in the Gaza’s northern region Saturday afternoon, the spokesman said.

    “They were asking to enter the state of Israel after being threatened by Hamas gunmen,” the spokesman said.

    The spokesman said the Palestinians, some of whom were wounded, were allowed to cross the border after they disarmed. He also said they would be asked about the events leading them to seek refuge in Israel.

    Those who suffered injuries were taken to a facility to receive medical treatment.

    It was a rare act that could be interpreted as a sign of Israel’s support of the Fatah party, which is led by Abbas.

    “It was a sort of humane gesture,” the IDF spokesman said.

    Hamas forces took control of the al-Shojaeya neighborhood in eastern Gaza City late Saturday, ending several hours of deadly fighting.

    The Hamas forces were battling a family suspected of harboring Fatah members wanted in last week’s Gaza beach bombing.

    Hamas police surrounded the clan, and a battle began with rocket-propelled grenades, rockets and rifles, sources said.

    The violence in the large neighborhood left four people dead, including two police officers, and wounded at least 60 others. Video Watch a report on the violence »

    The IDF confirmed that some of the Palestinians who entered Israel on Saturday were members of the clan.

    Hamas Interior Minister Said Salam said in a news conference that bomb-making materials were found. He asked why so many people would have fled to Israel if they weren’t guilty.

    Hamas forces began raiding houses in the 15-block neighborhood after the fighting died down, arresting at least 12 men Saturday night.

    Earlier, the Hilles clan, a family known to support Fatah, refused Hamas police demands to hand over 20 activists suspected in the bomb attack, sources said.

    Hamas security forces in Gaza had already detained hundreds of people affiliated with Fatah since five Hamas militants and a child died in the July 25 beach bombing. Fatah sources say about 450 were apprehended.

    Among the dead in the beach attack was Amar Musubah, a Hamas military commander, who has been the target of Israeli military assassination attempts.

    Fatah denied responsibility for the attack.

    Hamas sources said Saturday the group will release 10 Fatah members arrested earlier in Gaza.

    In addition, Hamas released Fatah spokesman Ibrahim Abu-Naja.

    Hamas also shut down a radio station, accusing it of airing pro-Fatah broadcasts.

    The two Palestinian factions have been bitterly divided since Hamas drove Abbas’ security forces from Gaza last year.

    Gaza tunnel collapse kills 5, hurts 16

    Meanwhile, early Saturday, a tunnel used to smuggle goods into Gaza from Egypt collapsed, killing at least five people and injuring 16, Palestinian sources said.

    The supply tunnel, which collapsed near Rafah, was one of many dug along the Gaza-Egypt border in the past year, since Israel closed border crossings.

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    The move followed Hamas’ takeover of the territory.

    The tunnel operations have grown into a big business. The tunnels are sometimes built too close to each other for safety.

    Journalist Talal Abu-Rahmi in Gaza contributed to this report.

     
  • zhafiz 10:31 am on July 20, 2008 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: Juan Cole, Zionist Critic   

    Juan Cole’s Jihad Against Israel

    by Cinnamon Stillwell
    FrontPageMagazine.com
    July 9, 2008
    http://www.meforum.org/article/1930

    One can always count on University of Michigan history professor Juan Cole to excuse violence and hatred directed at Israel. At his blog, Informed Comment (which, judging by the references to the mythical Jenin “massacre” and the USS Liberty canard in the comments section, is read avidly by anti-Israel conspiracy theorists), Cole takes pains to explain away last week’s horrific bulldozer attack in Jerusalem.

    Cole apparently sees no contradiction between his perfunctory admission that “Violence against innocent civilians is always condemnable and deplored by IC,” and his claim to add “context” to the attack by trying to justify the alleged motivations of the perpetrator, Palestinian construction worker Husam Taysir Dwayat.

    Citing Al-Jazeera International (one of his favored sources), Cole asserts that, “the bulldozer operator had been working on a controversial rail line connecting West Jerusalem to Arab East Jerusalem, which many Palestinians feel will further disadvantage them.” He then launches into a litany of Israel’s supposed sins, including demolishing illegal buildings in East Jerusalem, what he calls “rapid encroachments on the Palestinians in the West Bank,” the so-called “violence of Israeli colonists (many of them Americans) against native Palestinians,” and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) use of military action to protect Israeli citizens from their genocidal neighbors.

    Among his sources, Cole cites the Israeli leftist “human rights group” B’Tselem, which has been known to play fast and loose with facts in order to provide a sympathetic media with lurid stories about imagined Israeli human rights transgressions—qualities that make the group an ideal source for Cole’s unlimited paranoia. Earlier this year Cole used the occasion of the Hamas-inspired media fabrication regarding electricity and fuel shortages to accuse Israel of perpetrating atrocities, war crimes, and slavery against Gazans, not to mention killing asthmatics and newborns. Yet Cole can’t muster the same outrage over the calculated murder of women, children, infants, and any civilian unlucky enough to have crossed paths with Dwayat’s bulldozer.

    As for Dwayat’s motivations, Cole chooses to ignore the fact that he yelled “Allah Akbar” while stepping on the gas pedal, that his mother praised him as a shaheed (martyr) while ululating from the balcony of the family home, or that Palestinian terrorist groups are tripping over themselves trying to take credit for the attack. Meanwhile, his family blames the Jewish woman with whom Dwayat was once involved (and who he was convicted of raping) and his neighbors continue to repeat rumors about “haredi teenagers” throwing stones at Dwayat the day before the attack. But in Cole’s morally relativistic world, Dwayat was simply forced to mow down Israeli civilians because he was “seized with a fit of rage over accumulated grievances in his own mind, real or imagined.” So much for context.

    Such obfuscation is standard fare for Cole, who continues to insist that Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmedinjad was mistranslated when, at the aptly named World without Zionism conference in October, 2005, he said that Israel should be “wiped off the map.” Of course, the Iranian regime constantly calls for Israel’s destruction and regularly evinces hatred towards Jews. Iran’s state-run television replays a seemingly endless repertoire of conspiratorial, anti-Semitic programming, much of which mirrors Nazi-era propaganda. The allegation that the films “Chicken Run” and “Saving Private Ryan” are tools for “Zionist propaganda” is just a recent example. Perhaps Cole can justify that ludicrous claim as well. After all, he’s accused Jewish-American officials of dual loyalty, and he has a habit of taking Iranian regime-owned press at face value.

    Cole’s use of his blog to peddle conspiratorial tendencies directed at the United States in general, and those on the right in particular, is nothing new. Writing at his blog in January this year, Cole implied that the harassment of U.S. Navy vessels in the Straits of Hormuz by Iranian patrol craft was part of a GOP conspiracy. As Campus Watch director Winfield Myers noted at the time:

    That a Middle East studies professor upon whom the press relies for insight into this key region can be so wrong-headed in so many ways—and in a single blog post—bodes ill for efforts to bring supply the American public with accurate, reliable information about the Middle East. Overt biases, a selective reading of sources to support preordained conclusions, an eagerness to believe the press of foreign dictatorships over one’s own Navy, and the reliance on crude conspiracy theories will ensure only that consumers of media reports on the region are too often misinformed, and that academic Middle East specialists are further discredited.

    The real context for Cole’s apologia for Dwayat, the bulldozer terrorist, and his “grievances,” is that Cole’s so-called informed commentary is a font of uninformed conspiracy-mongering where terrorists are excused and the regimes that support them whitewashed.

    Cinnamon Stillwell is the Northern California Representative for Campus Watch, a project of the Middle East Forum. She can be reached at stillwell@meforum.org.

     
  • zhafiz 10:30 am on July 20, 2008 Permalink | Reply
    Tags:   

    What’s at Stake for the West in Lebanon?

    A briefing by David Wurmser
    March 6, 2008
    http://www.meforum.org/article/1878

    David Wurmser is a specialist on the Middle East and served as an advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney until recently. His prior positions included special assistant to John R. Bolton at the Department of State and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Wurmser is the author of numerous influential papers and three books, including Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein (AEI Press, 1999). In 2000, he contributed to the Middle East Forum’s Lebanon Study Group report, “Ending Syria’s Occupation of Lebanon: The U.S. Role,” which condemned Syria’s occupation of Lebanon. He received a Ph.D. in international relations from Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Wurmser addressed the Middle East Forum on March 6, 2008 in New York City.

    “Iran’s Stake in the Levant”

    Mr. Wurmser calls Lebanon a “key battleground between the West as a whole and the forces that seek to drag the Middle East down.” The situation in Lebanon must be viewed in the context of the larger conflict in the region, which is becoming far more dangerous. Two years after the Cedar Revolution in March 2005, which was brought on by the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, the Lebanese are still living through a tragedy. The inability to install a new president today is indicative of the situation. It is because of the size and success of the popular demonstrations by the Lebanese, however, that Lebanon has become the focal point of the enemies of the West, namely Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah.

    Mr. Wurmser focused on the Iranian strategy toward Lebanon, arguing that Iran is undergoing a transformation, not in the direction of reform as the West hopes, but from a pure theocracy toward a “theofascist state on the edge of an even more aggressive foreign policy.” This transformation in Iranian politics, according to Mr. Wurmser, is being played out in Lebanon and in Gaza.

    Top American officials have made statements to the effect that U.S. and U.N. sanctions have hurt the Iranian regime, and that the support for former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and other figures deemed “moderate” in the December 2006 elections indicated the weakening of the Iranian regime. Mr. Wurmser asserts that this perception is false because it ignores the real indicators. Rather, a new power structure is emerging in Iran that is closely aligned with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. For example, Ahmadinejad fired many government officials and replaced them with a group of hard-core members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Mr. Wurmser singled out Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejehei, whom Ahmadinejad placed in control of Intelligence, who espouses an aggressive anti-Western foreign policy and supports terrorism; and Saeed Jalili, whom Ahmadinejad appointed as head nuclear negotiator for Iran, is a veteran of the IRGC who was mutilated in the Iran-Iraq war.

    Mr. Wurmser traced several of Ahmadinejad’s actions to Jalili’s 1990 book, Foreign Policy of the Prophet, arguing that Jalili’s writings, though they describe the time of Muhammad, are a blueprint for Iran today. Jalili cites an episode in which Muhammad told his followers to proselytize, not negotiate. In this spirit, Ahmedinejad has fired ambassadors and replaced them with more proselytizing ones. Jalili wrote about how Muhammad and his successors sent letters out to other tribes telling them to “convert or you will face the sword,” as well as to major powers in Byzantium and Persia. Mr. Wurmser linked this to Ahmedinejad’s sending similar letters to President Bush. He pointed out how the “language is lifted straight out of Jalili’s book, and that, in fact, “Jalili is the mind behind Ahmedinejad.”

    Mr. Wurmser analyzed tensions between IRGC officers and the ayatollahs whom the officers believe “betrayed the will of Allah” when they signed the treaty ending the Iran-Iraq war. A separate group of ayatollahs, based in Mashhad in northeastern Iran, sees itself as true believers. This group considers the current state of Islam to be weak, and it seeks to expose the West as “a collapsing, hollow tree.” It expects the imminent return of the Twelfth Imam, the hidden Imam at the center of the Twelver Sh’ia movement of Islam. Its version of Islam is messianic and apocalyptic, and according to Mr. Wurmser, it provides the ideological basis for Iran’s shift to a more aggressive and risk-seeking stance against the West.

    He also identified a radical change in Iranian’s notion of Islam. While the Iranian revolution defended Shi’ite interests and opposed Arab nationalism, over the past four years, “Iran has made a bold move to co-opt Arab nationalism.” The Arab-Israeli conflict has become a key issue on which Iran can attempt to seize leadership of the Islamic world from the Sunnis and Arabs. A central part of Iran’s national policy, Mr. Wurmser asserted, is to have an active war with Israel, be victorious, and seize leadership of the Muslim world. Iran’s success at assuming the mantle of Islam is evident in that in the past two or three years, Muslim Brotherhood leaders have recognized that Shi’ites are true Muslims, a concept that they had vehemently opposed previously.

    Mr. Wurmser argued that Iran needs Syria in order to co-opt Sunni politics and Arab nationalism. He called Syria a “geographic gateway for Iran to be a player in the Arab-Israeli conflict,” and through this, to maintain the appearance of a successful Iranian revolution. Ahmedinejad came to power because it was thought that the Iranian revolution was weak. If Syria collapses, Mr. Wurmser thinks Iran will implode and that Syria is the avenue through which to attack Iran. Gaza is also a battleground for Iran, said Wurmser, citing that 80% of terrorist activity in Gaza is committed by a force trained in Iran that answers directly to Damascus and Tehran.

    Mr. Wurmser considers things to have gone well for Ahmadinejad in the last few months. He compared Ahmadinejad’s bold opposition to the West and accusations of cowardliness on the part of followers who urge a more cautious policy to the way Hitler galvanized his generals in the 1930s by accusing them of lack of will. Disturbingly, each crisis increases Ahmadinejad’s reputation as his supporters rally round him.

    In his recommendation for American foreign policy, Mr. Wurmser stressed that the United States must take into account how its policies are perceived in the Middle East. In 2003, when the United States acquiesced to the European acceptance of the Iranian regime as a legitimate interlocutor on nuclear issues, the Iranians read this as tacit acceptance and, therefore, weakness. During the same year, when the U.N. sanctioned the American presence in Iraq, Iran saw this as weakness on the American part because the superpower asked for permission to strike. Mr. Wurmser described the summer of 2003 as a “key moment, because the momentum the Iranian people were building against the regime was punctured by perceived American weakness.”

    On the question of what concrete things the United States can do to support democracy in Lebanon, Mr. Wurmser emphasized the need for swift response to the assassinations of Lebanese leaders. At least six government officials have been killed since Hariri, but the U.S. response has been slow and ineffective. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and Syria are “killing the Lebanese government out of existence.” Mr. Wurmser concluded that “the United States can have an effect if we show we are committed to acting to preserve what happened in March 2005″ when the Lebanese staged the Cedar Revolution.

    Summary account by Mimi Stillman

     
    • Kissinger 4:49 am on July 28, 2008 Permalink | Reply

      How we spend our days is, of course, how we spend our lives.AnneDillardAnne Dillard

    • North Korea 3:25 pm on July 28, 2008 Permalink | Reply

      fails to accomplish the purpose for which it has always

  • zhafiz 10:28 am on July 20, 2008 Permalink | Reply
    Tags: Hezbollah, Hizbullah,   

    Hizbullah: A Short History 

    Hezbollah: A Short History

    by Augustus Richard Norton
    Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. 187 pp. $16.95.

    Reviewed by Hilal Khashan
    American University of Beirut

    Middle East Quarterly
    Spring 2008
    http://www.meforum.org/article/1903

    Norton, a professor at Boston University, disdains the “simplistic stereotypes” about Hezbollah and promises in his book a “balanced, nuanced account of this complex organization.” But his superficial treatment fails miserably. Norton summarily dismisses Hezbollah’s terrorist credentials, which he conveniently attributes to Iran. He describes Hezbollah as a Lebanese organization and neglects to link its ideology to Khomeini’s wilayat al-Faqih or guardianship of the jurisconsult concept. He ignores the organic linkage between Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Republic.

    Written in the wake of the 34-day summer war of 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah, Hezbollah: A Short History is intended to have mass market appeal. It fails for many reasons: Because it offers nothing new, is more entertaining than informative, and contains an inappropriately casual style, plus numerous typos, and countless factual errors, it is unappealing to the reader. The book is not nearly short enough but offers an overly-long lesson in faulty information, bad English, and worse Arabic.

    Norton butchers Arabic words and phrases. In Norton’s dictionary of wrong definitions, sitt, Arabic for lady, becomes “sister.” His translation of “the July war” is Harb al-Tammuz—”the war of the July.” Then there is “the hawk of Lebanon,” which in Arabic becomes al-Saqr Lubnan—”the hawk Lebanon.” Kamal Jumblatt is al-Jumblatt, yes, “the Jumblatt.” The Norton is out of control. This book is a linguistic bloodbath.

    Factually this book hardly does better. Norton cites June 5, 1982, as the date of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, but it took place on June 6. He refers to former prime minister Salim al-Huss’s “daughters” when Huss has only one daughter. He states that both Shi‘i and the majority of Sunni Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad is the “Rasul” (prophet), whereas, of course, all Muslims by definition believe that the Prophet is the Rasul. On page 11, he announces that there are seventeen recognized sects in Lebanon, but on page 46, there are now eighteen such sects. Here Hassan Nasrallah is “sayyid,” and there he is “seyyid.” Norton’s spelling is abysmal, including such howlers as the “Lebanonese government” and “Sierre Leone.”

    Norton fails to properly account for Hezbollah’s propaganda against Israel. On page 91, he says Hezbollah exhibited a slogan in Hebrew near the Israeli border that read: “If you come back, we’ll come back.” This is not a slogan, but verse 17: 8 from the Qur’an.

    Oddly, this self-proclaimed history of Hezbollah is two-thirds not about Hezbollah, discussing instead Shi‘ism in general and the confessional nature of Lebanese politics. Is the book’s title a marketing ploy or evidence of Norton’s ignorance of the subject?

    Norton’s book is the literary equivalent of antifreeze laced Chinese toothpaste. Has the Princeton press abandoned its review process?

     
  • zhafiz 10:46 am on July 19, 2008 Permalink | Reply  

    UnHoly War: Terror in the Name of Islam – A Review 

    Unholy War:
    Terror in the Name of Islam

    Review by Muqtedar Khan, Ph.D.

    John L. Esposito, Unholy Wars: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 196. Hardback, US $25.00.

    John Esposito is easily one of the world’s most preeminent scholars of Islam. His voice carries authority not only in the West but also in the Muslim World. In keeping with his stature as an important commentator on Islam, Esposito has responded to the attacks of September 11th, 2001, by writing a very important book. – Unholy Wars: Terror in the Name of Islam.

    In Unholy Wars, Esposito systematically addresses the political antecedents to the 9/11 attacks on the US by Al-Qaeda, the international terrorist organization masterminded by Usama Binladen. Esposito examines the recent history of US relations with the Muslim world and explains how a global sentiment of anti-Americanism has emerged in the Muslim World. He shows with great clarity how economic conditions, political underdevelopment, the shadow of Israeli occupation of Palestine and the continued presence of US supported authoritarian regimes in the Arab world have led to the festering of a deep seated resentment and anger towards the US. In a very systematic way Esposito succeeds in unraveling the layered complexity of global politics and explains how the phenomenon of global terrorism articulated in the language of Islam has emerged as a counter hegemonic force to pax Americana.

    The book begins with the story of Binladen and his rise from a shy youth to the preeminent ideologue of Jihad International. In Esposito’s narrative this mythical demon is humanized and it becomes easier for even the uninitiated to understand the choices that Binladen made and the historical and geopolitical circumstances that shaped his destiny.

    In chapter two Esposito writes a revealing genealogy of Jihad. He shows how and why this very important Islamic concept has now become a central pillar of Muslim consciousness and self-understanding. He also argues that the very understanding jihad is complex as well as contested. Going as far back as the Kharijite movement in early Islam, Esposito traces the different meanings that various Muslim scholars and groups have given to the principle of Jihad. He makes it clear that Jihad has shaped Muslim politics and its meanings have also been shaped by Muslim politics. It becomes clear how different Muslims can have such differing understanding of Jihad. For example Esposito points to how the present grand mufti of Egypt considers suicide bombing as martyrdom while the present grand mufti of Saudi Arabia declares it unIslamic (p. 100). He follows the genealogy of Jihad with a comprehensive survey of global Islamic militancy covering the entire spread of Islam from Indonesia to the US. The survey establishes how the different understanding of Jihad has shaped the various tactics adopted by Islamic movements and Islamic militants.

    Esposito also address the loud claims of neoconservatives in America who claim that Islam itself, not just radical Muslims, is inherently incompatible with the cluster of values which some pretentious westerners call Western and liberals call universal. Esposito disabuses the notion that Islam and capitalism, Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights are incompatible. He also examines in great depth the struggle for women’s rights in Muslim societies today.

    Finally Esposito focuses on what must be done next. He raises the issue of “root causes” (p. 160) and makes no bones about stating that unless Muslim grievances are addressed wisely and the economic and political conditions that engender terrorism ameliorated, globalism terrorism will continue to plague the West and authoritarian Muslim regimes. He however stops short of making any specific policy recommendations with regards to how the US may specifically deal with Iraq or Hamas or Saudi Arabia’s linkage with Wahhabism. The role of this book is to provide an understanding of the context – political and historical – that motivates Muslims terrorism and how these so called Islamic warriors implicate Islam in their dastardly tactics.

    Nevertheless Esposito does not pull any punches in making it clear that Islam is a global force and will remain so for a long time to come. He also seems to suggest that Islamism may well grow rather than ebb. He fears that the shortsighted vision that is guiding the so called war on terrorism that seems to rely on military options more than diplomacy and social change may well prove to be counterproductive. Instead of eliminating terror, he fears, it may engender greater anti-American and anti-Western sentiment and lead to more bloodshed and global instability.

    http://www.ijtihad.org/esposito.htm

     
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